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Introduction
The killing of 34 mineworkers on August 16 th 2012 at South Africa's Marikana platinum mine came to symbolise the struggle for recognition by the country's disenfranchised miners.
Over the past century mining has often been seen as a world apart from the rest of South African economy and society, a 'labour aristocracy' with the highest levels of union representation by the country's most powerful union; a dangerous job, yet a coveted one in the context of 35-40% unemployment. What is more surprising then, is that Marikana came to embody a broader struggle by underpaid and marginalised workers in other sectors, by subcontractors at the mercy of flexible contracts and ruthless labour brokers, by the jobless inhabitants of squatter camps who live on the fringes of mine territories, by those who have lived in a state of chronic impermanence which has come to permanently define the new South Africa for many millions of its citizens. The events at Marikana were seen by many commentators as the inevitable culmination of neoliberal economics and divisive politics, as the battle for political liberation gave way to the unfulfilled promise of economic emancipation. Such analyses had a pre-determinism about them. But this teleological coherence is misleading. Looking back over the past decade, there were points of much more widespread hope or expectation when the bold promise of partnership between the mining industry, government and civil society in a mutual project of patriotic capitalism and corporate social responsibility (CSR) seemed to portend something very different than the extreme repressive violence witnessed at Marikana. At the heart of this vision of development sat South Africa's rehabilitated corporate citizens as midwives of the new South
Africa and self-styled architects of economic empowerment.
This article considers the resurgence in state-backed violence against mineworkers, which reached its apogee at Marikana, in relation to the rise of CSR within the postrevolutionary political economy. What is so striking, and what this paper explores, is precisely the capacity of transnational corporations to deploy the affective relations of CSR, alongside everyday and exceptional forms of violence. The contribution is based on ethnographic research conducted over the past decade, tracking processes of CSR in the mining industry from the London and Johannesburg headquarters of mining multinationals to the mineshafts of South Africa's Platinum Belt. I argue that Marikana highlights a paradox in the workings of CSR whereby it has become a vehicle through which mining companies dispense with (rather than fulfil) their social obligations and externalise (rather than address) their social impact. As this article explores, Marikana shows us how CSR can serve paradoxically as a resource which empowers companies (in response to their critics and claimants) rather than its supposed beneficiaries.
Marikana was not, as advocates of CSR would claim, an aberration in a new ethic of corporate citizenship within the mining industry. Nor was it, as critics would suggest, evidence of a simple gap between the rhetoric of corporate responsibility and reality of corporate hypocrisy 1 -a corporate smokescreen now blown away to reveal a bloody continuity with apartheid's labour repressive economy. 2 Rather, I suggest, the violence witnessed at Marikana is inextricably bound up with the moral economy of CSR; they are mutually sustaining and constitutive rather than antithetical. Certainly Marikana shows decisively that where CSR has yielded benefits for workers and peri-mining communities in the platinum regions, they have been limited, uneven and short term. Yet its impact, I
suggest, has been far-reaching: not in terms of its intended or stated beneficiaries, but in the ways it has enabled mining companies in South Africa to address expectations of social responsibility, while simultaneously externalising them. It has enabled companies to accrue moral authority, while displacing claims of entitlement and their attendant costs. Thus, this
article considers not what CSR did (or fails to do) for its supposed beneficiaries, but rather what it has done for its purveyors. I ask not how CSR has helped workers, but how it has helped corporations confront specific challenges.
In taking Marikana as a lens through which to explore this interplay of moral governance. In particular, it directs us to consider how, in a self-proclaimed era of ethical capitalism, the world's biggest mining companies attempt (not always successfully) to control and discipline their workforces and the peri-mining communities that surround their operations. By focusing on the apparatus of corporate power, rather than its targets, I hope to build on a series of powerful interventions that have sought to make sense of Marikana and its broader significance in relation to the historical struggles of South African workers. This emergent body of work has explored the evolving nature and status of work at the mines; 3 the shifting stance of trade unionism; 4 and its relation to broader transformations in the shape of protest across the country.
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This recent body of work has shown convincingly the convergence of National Union worker welfare and social responsibility to make them amenable to corporate interests; and secondly by making possible new (and politically correct) alliances between civil society, labour unions and the government on which they depended.
The first section briefly charts the rise of CSR in relation to the cycle of booming profits and plummeting prices on the platinum belt. I explore how mining companies set the terms and parameters of CSR, capitalizing on the 'moral' currency of corporate-state-civil society collaboration and sustainability, such that CSR itself became a lucrative moral, political and even financial resource for mining companies. I contextualise Marikana against the ubiquitous discourse of CSR that pervaded the South African mining industry in the early 2000s, and to that of corporate austerity that came after on the heels of financial crisis. The result is a narrative of corporate responsibility that is compelling yet fickle, extended and withdrawn at will.
Thus, as the second section explores, CSR became effective at institutionalising a new kind of corporate moral authority in South Africa; lubricating the realignment of governance structures and worker organisation in the post-apartheid political economy. This furthered corporate interests while foreclosing channels for people to make claims of entitlement (whether to a fairer wage, better conditions or simply more security) from below. This has left workers with a double vulnerability, as their own weapons of collective action and claimmaking have been delegitimised or corporatized within a new economy of self-empowerment and market morality. Paradoxically, I suggest, the kinds of social relations established through CSR in the first decade of the new millennium laid the foundation for the ensuing repression of labour from 2010.
Yet, as the second half of the article considers, it is not only at an ideological level that CSR has worked to marginalise counter claims. It has served materially as leverage for corporations to dispense with the social obligations that were assumed to be the natural corollary to declarations of corporate responsibility. With its emphasis on individual selfactualisation and self-empowerment (a register mirrored in NUM discourse), CSR serves as a cost-effective way of claiming the moral capital of social guardianship while dispensing with core social costs of the industry and the costly paternalism of the classic company town.
In section four I examine how this form of 'socially responsible' corporate management works as a dual process of externalisation and co-option, or put more crudely, divide and rule. In providing a framework for incorporating certain carefully demarcated aspects of social responsibility within a logic of benevolence rather than entitlement, CSR serves as an exclusionary mechanism to externalise social obligation and marginalize dissent, for a while. Contingent on workers' capacity to demonstrate entrepreneurial virtues necessary for self-empowerment and upward mobility, even within the rigid hierarchy of a formal workforce, the benefits delivered through CSR are unpredictable and uneven. Resting on myths of mobility, the discursive power of CSR to deflect expectation to the ever-receding horizon of aspiration, proffered a hope that was at odds with the material reality of most mineworkers, yet was daily stoked by the sense of boom and profit on the streets supposedly 'paved with platinum' prior to the onset of financial crisis in 2008. 9 One of the few material investments the company points to as a concrete expression of responsibility to their workforce is 'improving employee accommodation ' . 10 Yet upgrading hostel dormitories to single or family occupancy apartments has been a self-proclaimed (but unfulfilled) priority of CSR across the South Africa mining industry since the end of apartheid; it has been held up as a cornerstone of the corporate commitment to worker dignity and autonomy (a theme I will return to later).
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Alongside employee relations, Lonmin cites four further pillars of Sustainability.
These relate both to their workforce ('employee health and safety') and beyond, as in the In recent months we have seen intense pressure for pay increases that are economically simply not sustainable. In the platinum sector, that pressure has been placed on an industry that is already in crisis…. We will not shirk from taking the tough choices. For the sake of all our stakeholders, we have to create a business that is…the right size and shape to compete successfully in the global market.
retrenchments) was devolved to workers, despite the fact that they did not share in the immense boons of platinum boomtime enjoyed by investors just a few years earlier.
A large proportion of the 19,000 retrenched Anglo employees were at Anglo Platinum, which was responsible for a fifth of all recession-linked formal sector job losses in South Africa. 16 The country's other major platinum houses followed suit, amounting to tens of thousands of former employees at the platinum mines no longer eligible for companysponsored benefits such as housing and healthcare offered as part of a company's core or submural CSR to its workforce. In such a context of mass joblessness, 'those with jobs', as
Gumede puts it, 'cling on to them, for fear they may never get one again'. 17 Yet they are all the more vulnerable to the dictates of a volatile global market and the shibboleth of shareholder value invoked by corporate management as a rejoinder to workers' struggle for better conditions and a fairer wage.
This highlights the precariousness that has come to define having a job as well as for the decade prior to the economic crisis while platinum revenues soared but worker pay dropped?
In the wake of the global financial crisis, and even greater levels of economic disenfranchisement, companies have turned to the more repressive measures of old to meet the new challenges which have been nourished by the seductive yet fickle promise of CSR itself, but which the coercive benevolence of corporate responsibility can no longer contain.
This highlights the performative dimension of control as a key concern not just for the state, as is commonly assumed, but for corporations. In demonstrating a company's capacity to contain and remove social and political challenges to extraction, the performance of governing the workforce (through whatever means necessary) is as imperative to its bottom dismissal rather than negotiation) and renew investor confidence in a continued stream of platinum and revenue in the future:
Given the extent of the violence…the possibility exists that the strike could extend across the rest of the Lonmin workforce and potentially the broader industry. For Lonmin that uncertainty is particularly dangerous as our forecasts suggest that in the event of a protracted strike the company could breach its debt covenant levels when they are tested at the end of September.
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Within the capital markets of volatile investors, where perception translates into capital, the need to project a corporate image of stability, efficiency and confidence makes the performative aspects of corporate practice all-important, both in securing support and disciplining dissent. This performance of control and efficiency involves mining companies moving between the twin poles of violence and social responsibility.
Co-option and Corporatization
As highlighted earlier, studies of corporate power and state collusion in resource extraction tend to focus on the violent mechanisms employed in repressing worker resistance and local contestation. I suggest that this violence is connected to and enabled by its twin: the moral mechanisms of partnership, collaboration and social responsibility. As I have argued elsewhere, 26 CSR, with its immense capacity for claiming consensus while effecting cooption, has itself served as a novel tool of managerial control over the workforce and over the particular slice of social life in which extractive companies have an interest. Crucially, claims to corporate responsibility and corporate citizenship provide crucial discursive support and authentication to this project of alliance-building in the defence and advancement of elite corporate and political interests. This essential role of CSR is acknowledged as much by corporate executives themselves as by their critics -as noted above, 'collaboration with government' is cited as the fifth pillar of Lonmin's 'Sustainability' strategy. And, just as Anglo Platinum's chief CSR officer described the function of CSR at the operational level as a 'buffer between the company and the demands of the workers and community', Paul
Gilbert similarly recounts frontier mining investors in London referring to CSR 'as your first line of defence against resource nationalist governments intent on expropriating assets'.
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What connects these two quite different dimensions of corporate strategy and action is the malleability of CSR -the fact that it can be adapted and deployed in confronting various publics, and diverse challenges from worker demands for better conditions to political demands for sovereignty over a nation's mineral wealth. CSR works to co-opt consent and build alliances between corporate agents, political elites, and even the representatives of labour.
A salient expression of this can be seen in the way South Africa's mining giants have successfully forged a newly collaborative relationship with the NUM over the past decade.
Across the mining industry, this corporate-NUM partnership has been projected as both a focus for and success of CSR -proclaiming a joint ethic of responsibility for workers in which, importantly, notions of worker welfare and solidarity have been replaced by those of worker autonomy, mobility and empowerment. This is not simply a change in terminology.
It reflects a deeper transformation, demonstrating a surprising convergence of corporate and NUM ideology that has had material consequences for the ways in which workers are both supported and disciplined. 'We're teaming up with labour' to tackle social problems, announces an Anglo Platinum billboard affixed to the 12-foot razor wire that encircles the precious metals refinery in Rustenburg -a visual testament to the extent to which CSR has provided a platform for corporate-union partnership. This shift is spurred on by the exhortation to relinquish old-school combativeness in favour of collective commitment (and indeed sacrifice) to the national project of good growth. The normative effect of this discourse of national unity in good growth is powerful, enabling South Africa's largest corporations not only to claim a monopoly on economic patriotism but, as Marikana exemplified, to delegitimise claims that run counter to corporate interests. The NUM thus emerged as a 'bulwark… against disruptive conduct, grassroots extremism, and similar temptations to "ungovernability"' 28 .
The focus of those concerns has been the growing discontent among the poorest paid The kind of job that I do is called square. Square is one works at a very low kind of an opening.
Working there, Mr Chairperson, one works in a position where you are always bending, one might be forced to work in that bending condition for up to eight hours. The machine that one uses has got to be balanced on the stomach…. billion portfolio of borrowers. 36 Part of the bank's appeal (aside from a geographical monopoly in many peri-mining areas) lies not in its relatively high interest rates and initiation fees, which many argue are perilously high for the low-wage mineworkers whom the bank targets 37 , but in the enticing bundles of mobile phone airtime, shop vouchers and public transport discount cards which are rolled into the loans packages.
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The compelling images of empowered South Africans projected in U-Bank advertising adopts an aesthetic of new South African citizenship, embodying the core virtues and values of upward mobility, youth and entrepreneurialism. This is an aesthetic which is utterly at odds with the grinding reality of life both underground and in the shacks of the squatter camps around the Marikana platinum mines, and which belies the extent to which the ubiquity of easy credit can create new vulnerabilities under the banner of empowerment.
Indebtedness (and the impossibility of repayment) emerges from the accounts of platinum workers, as a defining element of the material deprivation that has become a normal and pervasive aspect of life on the platinum belt. 39 And it is this more mundane violence of debt and poverty, to which the migrant rockdrillers have long been subject,that found concrete physical expression in the killings at Marikana. 40 The loans on offer may be classified as 'small' but they are extremely costly to the debtors. Average interest rates on unsecured loans are 5% per month (ie. more than 70% interest annually), added to which is a service charge of R50 per month, a one-off initiation fee of 15% of the value of the loan, and collection fees for 
Divide and Rule
The last section explored how corporatization has become a vital tool for corporations in securing the collaboration of traditional structures of worker agency, namely the NUM.
These processes of co-option are premised on the ideological power of an exclusive dream of upward mobility that remains elusive to the poorest mine workers. Writing of labour on the Mombasa Docks, Fred Cooper described the capacity of capital to draw a stark divide between job and no job. 44 In the post-apartheid workplace that stark divide has become fragmented -riven by inequalities between skilled and unskilled worker, between old and young, and most significantly of all, between contractor and subcontractor, which erode the basis of their collective action. 45 Excluded, to a large extent, from union representation (as a result both of the failure of the NUM to represent their interests and the fear of dismissal if they do join up), subcontracted workers find themselves to be doubly vulnerable as their interests are seen to be at odds with those of the permanent workforce (for whom the fear of being replaced by cheaper contractors acts as a constant corporate rejoinder to their struggle for better wages). What is more, in an age of CSR and public-private partnership, when increasing aspects of social welfare are being dispensed by non-state entities to specific constituencies through exclusionary processes of corporate care, it is not purely 'capital' that can be credited with creating such fragmentation and inequities.
The rise in CSR over the past twenty years, and its associated interventions in worker welfare, has paralleled the increasing reliance on sub-contracting in the industry since the early 1990s. And, as Chinguno points out, platinum mining uses more subcontractors than any other sector of the industry. 46 Once reserved primarily for 'non-core' work such as shaftsinking, subcontractors now constitute more than a third of the workforce at most of the platinum mines. Thus in 2011 9,131 of Lonmin's total workforce of 33,046 were full-time contractors. 47 Equally, while Anglo Platinum drastically reduced its use of subcontractors Alongside this displacement of corporate obligation, comes an assertion of corporate social responsibility and the promise to fund 'the education of all the children of employees who lost their lives… from primary school through to university'. This offer is framed as an act of compassionate benevolence and generosity -the corporate gift -within the logic of CSR rather than compensation or duty (as was the company's offer to bury the dead mineworkers). This was reiterated in Lonmin's presentation to the Commission:
Lonmin resolved that the best and most enduring contribution it could make would be to provide its deceased employees' dependent children with an education. Consequently it established a memorial trust fund to fund their school and tertiary education…. Lonmin undertook a needs analysis at schools … in order to establish if the children had what they needed. During those visits it was established that the children needed additional toiletries, books and stationary… Lonmin immediately provided these items, as well as laptops, scanners and printers... The costs of these ad hoc education related expenses was just over R143 000.
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Here we begin to see how CSR acts as strategic resource for corporations, looking to deal (or dispense) with specific challenges, demands and claims. Within the framework of CSR, responsibility is claimed by Lonmin, yet obligation is deflected and claims to 
Responsibility and Externalization
On the first day of the Marikana Commission, the names of the deceased were read out.
Judge Farlam asked their families to stand up. No one stood up. Most were over 1000km away in the labour sending areas of the Eastern Cape with no resources to travel to the inquiry. Adjournments requested by AMCU's lawyers until the families could be brought to the inquiry were challenged by Lonmin and NUM lawyers and rejected by the judge. The underlying assumption was that mineworkers' families, having not been present during the strike, and living far from the workplace, would have nothing to contribute to the inquiry.
This reveals a striking continuity with the apartheid minescape (both geographically and socially) -a myopic industry gaze which divorced the human capital of the workforce from the delicate tissue of social relations, domestic lives and family in which migrant miners are embedded. This abstraction was determined by and sustained the political economy of migrancy on which the industry has depended for over a century. This way of 'seeing' the workforce as bounded within a delimited zone of responsibility that corresponds with the physical space of the workplace has been replicated in union discourse. As Ramphele points out, the dominant categorisation of mineworkers as 'migrant labourers' has delineated 'legitimate shop-floor issues' from 'non-trade union ones' 51 so as to make it difficult for unions to campaign on issues related to workers' home-life. The geographic distance between labour sending areas and mines has facilitated this century-long denial of the social world of migrant mineworkers beyond the hostel and the mine that continues to be excised from the picture.
Yet it is not simply geographical distance that has enabled the mining industry to displace its social responsibilities and costs onto poor rural households. Those families who live right outside the mine's perimeter fence are equally (if not more) excluded from the vision of mine management. This was summed up most poignantly by the AMCU lawyer:
'We went to get these families from a thousand kilometres away, but nobody has ever mentioned what has happened to these second families' 52 .
At its most basic level, the reality that is expunged from this corporate vision is that of migrancy, embodied in the figure of the rockdriller. Within this meta-narrative of denial, the material reality of migrant life continues to be externalised from the framework of CSR. The reality (largely unacknowledged by the mines' housing services) is that for a miner supporting a family in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal or Lesotho, the living-out allowance (roughly R1000-1800) is barely enough to rent a shack in the settlements near work. Barnard Yet this rejection of paternalism equally enables companies to dispense with social responsibilities to their workforce at the very moment they are asserting them. As another NUM shop steward put it:
In the past the mine would supply a concrete "bed" and meals. Workers could send home to the rural areas most of their pay….
[Now] on our small wages we have to pay for our own beds and meals.
Many workers now have two families here and back home. According to Ramaphosa, 'the target… could not be met… in view of the global impact the company was subjected to'. 61 However, a report by a third party into Lonmin's post-crisis financials, entered into evidence, noted that:
The primary justification for its non-compliance with its housing obligations was the constraints of the economic climate after the financial crisis, but Lonmin started defaulting on its housing obligations before the financial crisis and throughout the period in which it was defaulting on its housing obligations, it's continuing paying dividends to its shareholders.
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In mobilizing the language of financial and legal accountability with the terms 'obligation'
and 'defaulting' to describe Lonmin's failure to fulfil its commitments to housebuilding and hostel upgrading, the report provides a notable counterpoint to the register of corporate responsibility and care favoured by companies. For the framework of CSR forestalls this form of legal accounting on their social promises (and claims to entitlement that attempt to make good on them) precisely through recourse to the notion of responsibility in place of obligation.
Importantly, Lonmin's recourse here is not simply to invoke the imperatives of the financial crisis, but, once again, to couple this narrative of financial hardship with the invocation of a broader assertion of corporate responsibility which overrides the specific of corporate responsibility in itself, driven by a commitment to grow the workforce which, on his account, overshadows the imperative to make the current living conditions of workers liveable. Once again the provision of decent housing for migrant workers is framed as a 'good thing', an act of benevolence as opposed to a core employer obligation:
So there is circa R9 billion of capital sitting there, cannot be used and we can't finish the shaft because we don't have enough cash available to finish the shaft. And it may not sound politically correct to say this but if I have a choice between putting money in housing or hostel conversion, I would say rather put that into finishing the shaft because if you finish the shaft, K4 has the potential of employing a further 10,000 people, generating lots of cash which then puts you in a position to do the kind of good things like converting hostels and building houses.
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Marikana reminds us how perilous this new social/moral contract (if it can even be called that) is, as one premised on a form of corporate patronage that is simultaneously coercive and fickle -it can be extended or withdrawn at will. This was captured in the most visceral way in the ongoing period of strikes that paralysed the industry following Marikana.
In late May 2014, in the second year of strikes, in a bid to get rockdrillers back to work, Anglo American closed the hostel kitchens where a great many miners, even those who do not live in the hostels, survive on one meal a day. This single act brought into sharp focus the violence of corporate responsibility as an instrument of benevolent tyranny (or tyrannical benevolence?) that enables companies to give and withhold benefits as techniques of control used in undermining worker agency. The backdrop to Marikana and its aftermath have reaffirmed that CSR has the peculiar capacity to dehumanize even as it claims an ethic of care. This form of corporate welfare turns humans into human capital, a productive resource to be nurtured, controlled or repressed through the provision or withholding of even the most 64 Testimony of Mahommed Seedat, p. 37714. basic welfare and social goods, in this case food.
Conclusion: Expectations of Paternalism
The platinum protests brought together subcontractors, rockdrillers and squatters alike in ways that defy corporate processes of control and co-option, divide and rule chronicled in this article. They created new solidarities in collective demands for protection and security. Such petitions for a renewal of corporate paternalism may seem anachronistic-recalling in part the Thompsonian moral economy of the English peasantry seeking protection from their overlords against the ravages of the market 65 . But as the only recourse left for claim-making from below, these expectations of paternalism reveal change as much as continuity in both corporate techniques of governance at South African's mining territories, and responses to those techniques. For, while the practices of CSR reinvigorate century-old forms of patronage and clientelism both on and around the mines, they are now more exclusionary and more contingent than the total and comprehensive paternalism once so characteristic of the Southern African minescape. 66 Meanwhile, the logic of CSR -framed either as business opportunity or an act of compassion -obviates the very notion of worker entitlement, and corresponding corporate obligation.
As Ferguson makes clear, such "declarations of dependence"-which in this case look to the self-styled corporate sponsors of welfare and empowerment rather than the stateshould be seen as an activist mode of claim-making, rather than a 'retrograde yearning for paternalism'. 67 After all, if corporations such as Anglo are to be taken seriously in their declarations of corporate social responsibility, it stands to reason that workers (as well as those who live tantalizingly close to the benefits extended through CSR) must try to compel companies to make good on their promise to take care of them, by whatever means they can.
If we look back to the early 2000s, one overlooked element in the rise of CSR (and particularly its enthusiastic uptake by South Africa's mining giants) was that it offered companies a framework with which to transform core costs into externalities (such as worker health, housing and BEE), and re-render social obligations as apparently voluntary acts of beneficence and mutuality. Having divested themselves of core welfare responsibilities in the name of progressive management and an end to paternalism, the dispensation of CSR could be withdrawn at will in subsequent 'lean' years, citing the imperative of cost-cutting.
This left beneficiaries triply vulnerable, for the discourse of CSR had been effective at softly disarming the instruments of worker mobilization through collaboration (or co-option), while diverting (or delegitimising) claim-making through a promise of mutual interest in good growth.
Three weeks after the Marikana killings, the ANC released a statement placing the blame squarely on AMCU. 'Agitating workers and giving them false promises is dangerous', the statement warned 68 . And yet, the intensity of disenfranchisement and disaffection that reached its apogee at Marikana, and in the three years since, must be seen as the product of a quite different false promise. The precarious hope of 'inclusive capitalism' offers a poor antidote for exposure to corporate efforts to relentlessly drive down costs in order to increase profits. As Chinguno writes, 'the mining industry, as it has always done, plays such an important role in assigning economic winners and losers, creating vast concentrations of wealth and institutionalised systems of exploitation' 69 . If winners in contemporary capitalism are defined by their capacity to claim benefits from those with the power or resources to deliver them (in this case a mining company), then the odds are certainly stacked against South Africa's rockdrillers. Presumed lacking in marketable assets, skills or simply potential, they are further marginalised from the exclusionary processes of empowerment.
For the paradox and the power of CSR lies in the fact that it expounds a doctrine of self-empowerment, demanding that beneficiaries demonstrate their will and capacity to 'help themselves', while at the same time, rejecting any form of 'claim-making' on the part of potential beneficiaries and any corresponding obligation on the part of the company.
Marikana brings home more strongly than ever before how precarious are paradigms of responsibility which invoke 'empowerment' in place of entitlement and eschew rights in favour of the fickle promise of emancipation through the market and the enlightened selfinterest of big business.
